UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 4
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND MINE
FATAL FALL OF RIB
White Knight Mine (I.D. 46-08055)
Elk Run Coal Company, Inc.
Sylvester, Boone County, West Virginia
September 9, 1996
by
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4
William J. Gray
Mining Engineer
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center
Jon A. Braenovich
Mining Engineering
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4
James E. Cline
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest Teaster, Jr., District Manager
OVERVIEW
Abstract
On Monday, September 9, 1996, at approximately 9:40 a.m., the
victim was performing maintenance on a cable conduit near the
right front side of a Fletcher RRII roof-bolting machine on the
West Mains section in the last open crosscut between the No. 2
and No. 3 entries. He was positioned 3 feet from the coal rib.
The total rib of coal and rock approximately 50 feet long fell,
with a section of this rib approximately 14 1/2 feet in length,
25 inches in width, and 13 1/2 inches in thickness, striking the
victim in the upper torso and lower extremities, crushing him
against the roof-bolting machine. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
was performed on the victim from the accident site to the
surface, without response. An ambulance from the Whitesville
Fire Department was waiting on the surface. The victim was
transported to the Charleston Area Medical Center and pronounced
dead at 12:01 p.m. on September 9, 1996, by Dr. Ieanez.
The accident and resultant fatality were a result of management's
failure to identify and effectively control hazardous rib
conditions on the West Mains section, where miners were required
to work or travel.
Background
The White Knight mine is operated by Elk Run Coal Company, Inc.,
and is located along Route 3 near Whitesville, Boone County, West
Virginia. The mine enters the Powellton coal seam through six
drift openings and averages 36 to 84 inches in height.
Employment is provided for a total of 75 miners, 72 working
underground and 3 working on the surface. There are two
production shifts and one maintenance shift which produce coal 5
to 6 days a week. The mine produces an average of 6,200 raw tons
of coal daily from two continuous-mining-machine super sections.
The West Mains and the Southwest Mains sections are mining on the
advance. The West Mains section started in January 1996,
developing seven entries approximately 4,900 feet off Southeast
Mains. Coal is transported from the working section to the
surface via belt conveyors. Employees and supplies are
transported into the mine by battery-powered, track-mounted
haulage equipment.
The immediate mine roof is comprised of sandstone and laminated
shale. The roof is supported with 48-inch, 5/8-inch-diameter,
resin-grouted rods and combination bolts. The supports are
installed on 4-foot lengthwise and 4- to 5-foot crosswise
spacings. The main headings are developed on 70- by 70-foot
centers. The roof control plan in effect at the mine was
approved by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) on
November 14, 1995.
Ventilation is induced into the mine by a 6-foot-diameter blowing
fan that produces 329,200 cubic feet of air per minute. Methane
liberation for the mine is undetectable.
The last AAA inspection at this mine was completed on June 6,
1996.
Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., is a subsidiary of A. T. Massey Coal
Company. The principal officers of Elk Run Coal Company, Inc.,
are James Slater, President; Dwayne Francisco, Vice President;
Roger L. Nicholson, Secretary; James S. Twigg, Treasurer; Doug
Williams, Superintendent; Gary Lilly, Mine Foreman; and Frank
Foster, Safety Director.
STORY OF EVENT
On Monday, September 9, 1996, the day-shift West Mains section
crew, under the supervision of Robert Cottle, section foreman,
entered the mine portal at 7:00 a.m via a battery-powered, track-mounted personnel carrier. At about 7:40 a.m., the crew arrived
at the West Mains section and Cottle examined the working places.
The section crew was instructed to commence their regular mining
cycles. Roger Callison, electrician, was instructed to report to
the No. 23 left-side Fletcher RRII roof-bolting machine, located
at the last open crosscut between the No. 2 and No. 3 entries of
the West Mains section, to repair the metal cables attached to
the ATRS System. After completing this assignment, Callison
decided to perform maintenance work on an electrical cable
conduit near the right-side drill boom of the roof-bolting
machine. He was in a sitting position beside the roof-bolting
machine with his back approximately 3 feet from the coal rib.
Approximately 9:40 a.m., the total rib of coal and rock
approximately 50 feet long fell, with a section of this rib
approximately 14 1/2 feet in length, 25 inches in width, and 13
1/2 inches in thickness, striking the victim in the upper torso
and lower extremities, crushing him against the roof-bolting
machine.
At the time of the accident, roof support was being installed in
the face of No. 3 Left. It is unknown if mining induced stress
onto the pillar block.
About 15 minutes prior to the fatal accident, James Facello,
roof-bolting-machine operator, had observed the victim repairing
the roof-bolting machine. According to Facello, the area where
the victim was working appeared to be normal; no bad coal ribs
were detected. Bruce Brown, roof-bolting-machine operator,
stated he was walking past the roof-bolting machine where the
victim was working to obtain a longer wrench to install roof
bolts. He was walking from the face of 3 left, when he observed
the victim pinned against the front right side of the roof-bolting machine. Brown ran to the No. 2 entry where he met and
informed Cottle of the accident. Cottle called for help on the
section. Efforts were started immediately to remove the victim
from underneath the coal/rock ribs. Emergency Medical
Technicians immediately started checking for vital signs, and
none were found during the examination.
Facello obtained large first-aid boxes from the power station.
Pete Quesenberry, continuous-mining-machine operator, brought
three Simplex jacks to the accident scene. Scott Lancianese,
face man, Quesenberry, Cottle, and Brown attempted to use the
Simplex lifting jacks to move the rock and coal materials off the
victim. After several unsuccessful attempts with the lifting
jacks, it was decided to use a long metal chain to secure the
rock and remove the rock materials with a scoop that was nearby.
Attempts were made from the front of the roof-bolting machine and
then from the rear of the roof-bolting machine. Meanwhile, a
telephone call was made to the surface to have someone call an
ambulance and to clear the track haulage for emergency removal of
the victim.
David Asbury, evening-shift foreman, and Gary Lilly, general mine
foreman, were outby the section examining evaluation points with
William Ross, MSHA ventilation specialist. Asbury went to the
belt-haulage system where a pager phone was available. Hearing
about the accident on the phone, he came back and informed Lilly
and Ross. They immediately went to the West Mains section.
According to Ross, CPR and first aid for the victim were already
in process. Around 10:35 a.m., the victim was placed on a
backboard, with CPR still in progress, and transported via the
man trip to the surface. Ross immediately posted closure signs
in the area around the accident scene, issued a 103(k) Order, and
advised management to withdraw the entire section crew and pull
the electrical power to the West Mains section. Most of the
section crew, who were EMTs, traveled to the surface with the
victim.
An ambulance from Whitesville Ambulance Service was waiting on
the surface about 11:10 a.m. The victim was transported to the
Charleston Area Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead at
12:01 p.m. by Dr. Ieanez.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
MSHA was notified of the accident at 10:30 a.m., on September 9,
1996. MSHA accident investigation personnel began to arrive at
the mine about 12:00 p.m.
MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and
Training jointly conducted an investigation with the assistance
of mine management personnel and miners from Elk Run Coal
Company, Inc. An engineer from the Pittsburgh Safety and Health
Technology Center was assigned to the investigation team and
conducted on-site examinations of the West Mains section.
MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and
Training conducted interviews of seven individuals believed to
have direct knowledge of facts surrounding the accident. The
interviews were conducted at the Elk Run Coal Company, Inc.,
training room at Sylvester, West Virginia, on September 10, 1996.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed September
12, 1996, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Training
Records indicate that training had been conducted in accordance
with 30 CFR, Part 48. An examination of the victim's training
records revealed that he had received all required training.
Roof Control
The mine roof in the face area where the accident occurred, as
well as in other areas on the section, was supported primarily by
48-inch resin-grouted rods. These rods were being installed on
4- to 5-foot crosswise and 4-foot lengthwise spacing as required
by the approved roof control plan. Entries and crosscuts were
developed on 70- by 70-foot centers to a width of 20 feet in
accordance with the approved roof control plan. An abandoned
mine was located in an overlying seam, adjacent to the mining in
the West Mains section. Even though this overlying mine was not
above this section, it may have influenced roof and rib
conditions. This overlying mine is approximately 180 feet above
the White Knight mine.
Statements taken during interviews revealed that the West Mains
section had experienced rib sloughage when the section was
started approximately 1 year ago. When loose, unconsolidated
ribs were encountered, they were taken down with a slate bar.
According to the preshift examiner's report on the West Mains
section, an adequate examination had been conducted prior to the
accident, and no hazardous conditions had been documented.
It was revealed during the accident investigation that the West
Mains section was bolted according to the approved roof control
plan. Roadway widths on the West Mains working section were not
excessive. There were numerous unconsolidated ribs observed on
the West Mains section by the accident investigation team. No
roof falls were observed during the investigation. The immediate
roof consisted of 0 to 26 feet of shale with a 10-inch coal rider
seam, and 0 to 40 feet of sandstone was the composition of the
main overhead roof strata. The immediate roof and mine floor
varied from wet to damp. The method of mining was room and
pillar.
Physical Factors
- The width of the crosscut between No. 2 and No. 3 entries
measured 19 feet 7 inches.
- The measured height at the accident scene was 84 inches.
- Maintenance work was being performed at the right front side
of the roof-bolting machine, underneath the storage rack
near the front tire.
- The roof-bolting machine was a Fletcher RRII dual-head
machine.
- The victim was in a sitting position with his back to the
solid coal rib, about 3 feet from the rib.
- The victim was working alone at the roof-bolting machine.
- The large section of the coal/rock rib that struck the
victim measured approximately 14 1/2 feet in length, 25
inches in width, and 13 1/2 inches in thickness.
- The accident occurred about 9:40 a.m. The victim was
transported to the surface to an awaiting ambulance about
11:05 a.m.
- More than eight coal/rock ribs were loose and separated
throughout the seven entries on the West Mains section.
- An abandoned mine was located 180 feet above in an overlying
seam in an area adjacent to the West Mains section.
- The area of the accident had approximately 1,000 feet of
cover, which exerted pressure on the coal pillars. (This
condition may have been compounded by the close proximity of
overlying mine workings.)
- The West Mains section had two sets of mining equipment
developing seven entries on a single split of air.
- An adequate preshift examination was not conducted on the
West Mains section, in that there were numerous
unconsolidated ribs where persons must travel. The ribs
were not controlled to protect persons from hazards related
to the falls from the ribs.
- Investigators' observations at the area where the accident
occurred revealed excessive rib sloughage.
- An autopsy performed by the State Medical Examiner indicated
that the cause of death was compression asphyxia and
multiple injuries.
CONCLUSION
The accident and resultant fatality were a result of management's
failure to identify and effectively control hazardous rib
conditions on the West Mains section where miners were required
to work or travel.
CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS
A 104(d)(1) Citation, No. 3961581, was issued for a violation of
Section 75.360, 30 CFR. The Citation stated that during a fatal
accident investigation, it was revealed that an adequate preshift
examination was not conducted on the 020 Mechanized Mining Unit,
West Mains section, in that loose, broken rock/coal ribs and
unsupported hanging rock brows were allowed to exist throughout
the section. These conditions existed starting at the No. 1
entry and going into the No. 7 entry and faces. The rock and
coal ribs measured 10 to 12 inches in thickness, 2 to 4 feet in
width, and 3 to 40 feet in length in six locations on the
section. Dates, times, and initials were not present in places
where persons were required to work or travel. These conditions
were not documented in the preshift examiner's book kept in the
surface mine office. These hazardous conditions were a
contributing factor of the accident.
A 104(d)(1) Order, No. 3961582, was issued, stating in part that
the roof and ribs of areas where miners are required to work and
travel were not supported or otherwise controlled to adequately
protect persons from hazards related to the falls of roof and
ribs on the West Mains section, a violation of Section 75.202(a),
30 CFR.
Respectfully Submitted by:
Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
William J. Gray
Mining Engineer
Jon A. Braenovich
Mining Engineer
James E. Cline
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Approved by:
Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB96C22
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